







Institute o f Development Studies 








Cuba is the scene of a great social "experiment". Inequalities 
in consumption have been drastically reduced and a heavy emphasis 
has been put on real incentives. Dire poverty was soon eliminated) 
but in the decade 1961 to 1971 growth of output of necessities 
was slow, suggesting that financial incentives were needed.
However the experiment was in a sense spoiled by two extraneous 
developments, the abandonment of both national financial balance 
and accounting in production units. These are being restored, 
with some apparent results in increased production. The years 
to come will throw more light on the relation between equality 
and growth.
/This is a country study from the IDS-IBRD volume on the 
reformulation of planning models.
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(By Dudley Seers
The key issues
1. In Cuba, the development strategy has put heavy emphasis 
on the elimination of poverty, through a sharp reduction in 
inequality. The equality in Cuba is now probably unique.
It is a case, therefore, highly pertinent to the issues of 
this report: if one could set up an experiment in the social
sciences, it might well look like Cuba.
• 2. Economic data on Cuba are scarce and it is impossible here
to deal at all fully with the results of the revolution. But
it seems broadly that, although there was a spurt forward in
many productive sectors immediately after the revolution,
the national income rose only about in line with population
2)from 1961 to 1968, and then declined in the following three 
years.^ The main issue therefore appears to be whether 
redistribution has inhibited growth.
3. But this is misleading. Before trying to explain what has 
occurred, I would like to point out that to discuss the
1) I would like to acknowledge the valuable research assistance 
of Richard Stanton.
2) See President Barticos in Economia y Pesarrollo, Ho. 12, 
p. 34. It is not clear whether adjustment had been made 
for price changes, but the most favourable assumption is 
that he was using a fixed-price comparison. Since wages 
and prices were frozen for much of this period, it would 
not matter greatly. However since the Marxist definition 
of income was presumably used, the actual rise was some­
what higher; this definition excludes the social services, 
precisely the most dynamic sector.
3) Ibid. Ho. 13 gives figures (p. 194) from which one can infer this.
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1 trade off” in these terms is in my view, theoretically
mistaken, when elimination of poverty is the central
objective. Then the important question to pose about a
country’s performance is not: how much did the nation’s
income grow? But rather, whose income grew? And what sort
of production increased? Increases in the income of the
top 20% have no direct impact on absolute poverty - and they
aggravate relative poverty (i.e. inequality). Besides if
the object is to. change the existing distribution of income
this implies the inappropriateness of prices; produced by
t i )this distribution and used in estimates of growth.
4. It is often argued that however narrowly the benefits 
of growth are concentrated, poverty can be cured one day
in the future, by redistributing the national product after 
it has increased. The political assumptions of this 
argument are questionable, because, growth makes those who 
benefit from it more powerful. But in any case, the 
conclusion does not necessarily follow even in purely economic 
terms. Because of the specificity of assets, it depends 
on what types of production increased - one cannot cure 
poverty by redistributing cosmetics or casino tickets.'
5. In the case of Cuba, there is indeed a question about 
the consistency of objectives, but it cannot be posed in
such naive terms. The movement of an aggregate has particularly 
little meaning when far-reaching changes take place in the 
structure of production and income, including the emigration
1) There are additional problems of measuring, or even
defining, the national income in countries with largerural populations.
2) It could be argued that casinos, if not croupiers, can
be converted to productive use - but this is expensive.
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of a large fraction of those who were formerly. The
question which is raised is the slowness in improving the
lot of the poor. In the first few years after the
revolution, dire poverty and unemployment were virtually
eliminated.1  ^ But further progress in the production of
necessities, especially food, or of goods which could be
exported, was slow. Sugar output in the 1970s (except
special effort which produced 8-J^million tons in 1969-
70) has not exceeded typical pre-revolutionary levels;
from 1962 to 1968-9 non-sugar agricultural output fell by
2)18# 'and sunolies of consumer goods including necessities,
3)such as food, grew tighter. Progress in rehousing
those in slum or overcrowded dwellings was slow. It is 
true that teaching and medical services, which are essential 
to the elimination of poverty, expanded rapidly. But the 
infant mortality rate obstinately remained around 40 per 
1 , 000)1
6. The key question is not whether the redistibution and
1) A comparison of nutritional surveys in 1967 with those 
made a decade earlier showed "a definite improvement" 
in the state of nutrition. "Health, Health Service
and Health Planning in Cuba", Vincente Navarro, Associate 
Professor at Johns Hopkins, in International Journal of 
Health Services. Aug. 1972. p. 406.
2) Economia y Desarrollo, No. 17, 1972, p. 160.
3) In 1969 there was an important increase from ■£— litre to 
1-litre a day in the milk ration for children under 7 
and other special categories (Navarro, loc. cit). but 
this may not have been fully reflected in actual 
consumption.
4) In fact this rate had been 35 in 1953. It is possible 
to ascribe the rise to 38 fa 1966 to Improvements in 
statistical collection (The JUCEPLAN statistical depart­
ment estimates that the correct figure should have been 
39 in Doth years - Resumen de 'stadisticas de Poblacion 
No. 3 Dec. 1967). Comparable data for subsequent years 
are not available, but partial information from 
consumer registration sources suggests a deterioration up 
to 1969 followed by an improvement in 1970 & 1971 (UN 
Demographic Yearbook 1971, Table 28).
the associated use of moral rather than material incentives 
caused the per capita incomes to rise little if at all 
between 1958 to 1971, but whether they contributed to the 
failure to make further substantial inroads into poverty 
after 1961.
The nre-revolutionary situation
7. It is necessary to see this issue in historical perspective.
In the 1950s, Cuba was beset by serious social problems.
1 )Open unemployment was some 16% in 1956-7, poverty was 
widespread, with a large fraction of the population illiterate
2 )and undernourished (especially those in large rural families). 
This was not, however, due to inadequate national income, which 
at about 0500 a head 'was quite high enough to make acute 
poverty unnecessary.
8. The distribution of this income was however highly
concentrated, and so was access to medical and educational
facilities. Although no coefficient of concentration can be
estimated, Cuba must have been among those countries in which
it was ’’relatively high” (i.e. >  0.5) (See Chapter 1). At
its roots lay a highly concentrated distribution of property,
especially of land, 9% of the landowners holding 75% of the 4)land. Many factories and much land belonged to foreign
1) '’Symposium de recursos naturales", Conse.io ^acional de 
Bconomia.Beb. 1958.
2) The sample surveys of rural workers carried out by the 
Catholic University Croup (ACU) demonstrates this. Bor 
example less than 10% of homes had running water.
5) Harry Oshima in Hood Research Institute Studies. Nov. 1961, 
p. 214. The equivalent figure would be around 01000 a 
head in today’s prices.
4) Bstimates by INRA before the land reform.
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companies. Contrasts between incomes, housing, health, 
educational levels, in Havana and the rural areas were partic­
ularly marked.
9. There seemed little prospect of the chronic poverty being 
alleviated. Up to the 1920s, the Cuban economy had advanced 
rapidly, with sugar output reaching 5 million tons in the mid- 
1920s, though developing severe inequalities in the process.
But in the following 3 decades progress was slow. Increased 
sugar output was restrained by quotas and industrialisation
by the Reciprocal Trade Agreement (1934) with United States.^ 
Apart from tourism (the benefits of which largely accrued 
either to foreigners or to groups and areas already rich) 
there was little dynamic in the economy, which had considerable 
surplus capacity in capital as well as labour. A succession
2 )of dictatorships notorious for their inefficiency and corruption ' 
repressed the political forces that favoured the redistribution 
of income.
Steos after the revolution to redistribute income.
10. ivlost of the implements of redistribution were used:-
(a) Assets were redistributed. Tenants of smallholdings
3)and houses became their owners. In additon, nationalis­
ation, which starting with foreign-owned companies and land­
holdings, spread to all productive assets. There was r\o 
compensation for United States asset-holders, and though most 
local property-owners were paid annuities, these involved 
a degree of expropriation. Much property (especially
housing) was abandoned by emigrants.
1) The pre-revolutionary period is analysed in "Cuba: The 
economic and social revolution" (Ed. Dudley Seers, U. 
of N. Carolina Press 1964).
2) "Report on Cuba" (Johns Hopkins, 1951) by an IBRD mission
was particularly scathing, describing the Ministry of
Education as "a principal focus of political patronage 
and graft...a cave of entrenched bandits and of gunmen 
and an asylum of professional highway robbers" (p.425). 
These unusually strong words, for a report published 
under the Bank's auspices, speak for the international 
reputation of Cuba in that period.
3) After the second stage of the agrarian reform in 1963, 24%
of land remained in orivate hands. (Economia y Desarrollo. N n  . _ 1 7 __ 1 Q 7 ?  _ 1 ,1 p f  ___________
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(b) Public investment and consumption were concentrated on 
the poor, especially health and educational services.
Particular attention was paid to the reduction of illiteracy, 
and there was a very big increase in adult education at all 
levels, including technical training. The expansion of public 
expenditure made big inroads into unemployment, and by being 
concentrated in rural areas it helped reduce the urban-rural 
imbalance.
(c) Income was redistributed in the following ways:-
(i) Wages were increased, especially at lower levels, 
the effective minimum becoming by 1971 nearly 100 pesos 
a month, for both agriculture and industry. Pensions 
were made universal and raised to levels near or at 
the corresponding wage levels. At the other end of the 
scale, salary rates for managerial jobs were reduced, 
few being left above 300 pesos, so that a span of about 
3:1 covered the great majority of wage and salary rates.1)
(ii) Piece rates and other incentive payments were 
abolished, and claims for overtime discouraged.2) Stress 
was laid, especially in education, on moral incentives, 
made concrete in medals, titles, etc., to take the place 
of financial acquisitiveness.
(iii) Charges for medical attention, schooling and some 
other services, (e.g. school meals, entrance to sporting 
events, local telephone calls) were eli inated, as 
were loan obligations of smallholders. Basic food­
stuffs were put on ration and their prices were kept 
low, and so were the prices^0f other necessities such as 
bus journeys. Consequently the range of real incomes 
became even less than that of money incomes.
11. The government was strong enough after the revolution to 
put the redistributive measures into effect. The political 
power of not merely the poor rural areas, where the 
revolution originated, but also many urban dwellers had been 
mobilised. The military and police forces, which had been 
an integral part of the former
1) An official currently in a senior post was allowed a personal
supplement to maintain his income level.
2) However, workers in establishments with good records of
attendance and voluntary work were allowed higher pensions when they retired.
regime, and might have attempted to overthrow the new one, 
were disbanded and replaced, and many of the rich started 
to emigrate.
Causes of production problems
12. The measures outlined in paragraph 10 had an impact 
on poverty.^ Why was the improvement not sustained? Of 
course, at this stage, 15 years after the revolution, a 
thoroughgoing evaluation would be premature. Evaluations 
of the social progress of the Soviet or Chinese revolutions 
after only 15 years would have proved misleading. Never­
theless it is possible to indicate some elements in the 
explanation.
15. It might have been expected that the reduced concen­
tration of income would lead to a fall in investment. How­
ever, this has not happened in Cuba. Investment has been 
almost completely under public control, and has been 
supported by heavy aid, especially from the Soviet Union.
It has been more than 20^ of the national income.
14. Part of the explanation of production difficulties lay 
in the international context. The loss of professional and 
skilled manpower through emigration to the United States 
aggravated production problems. So did the switch to Soviet 
and East European sources of supply for intermediate pro­
ducts and equipment, especially spare parts, as a result of
a trade embargo, and the same sources of technical expertise. 
(Cuba was neglected by many aid agencies, even multilateral 
ones). Moreover, part of the country's resources were tied 
up in military preparations to deal with possible invasions, 
especially after the Bay of Pigs.
15. Yet by the early 1970s these problems had been eased. 
xn many sectors, the loss of qualified personnel had been
1) A 'poverty-weighted' national income would show a sharp 
rise in the first few years after the revolution, 
though perhaps an index giving all the weight to the 
bottom 40^ would be more meaningful - at least in Cuba. 
Such an index would not allow, of course, for the rise 
in the welfare of the poor due to public services and 
price changes.
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; offset by the results of the big increase in education 
and training programmes; the conversion to COMECON 
sources of inputs had been very largely completed; and 
the threat of invasion had dwindled. Indeed the trade 
embargo and military intervention were in some respects 
economic assets. They provided an excuse for shortages; 
by stimulating nationalism, they also encouraged voluntary 
labour, which was extensively used to break production 
bottlenecks. The cutting of trade and other links with 
countries in the Western Hemisphere reduced the 
’’demonstration effect” of standards of consumption which 
could not be afforded by the population as a whole, as 
well as the influence of technical assistance which would 
doubtless have been inappropriate for Cuba’s development 
strategy.
16. A main cause of production problems has to be sought
in economic management. The economy has lacked the central
rationale of either a price system or an overall develop- 
1 )ment plan, which was a contributory factor in policy 
mistakes (e.g. reversals of sugar policy). Moreover, 
financial balances were abandoned for both individual 
enterprises and the economy as a whole.
17. Managers of factories and farms ceased to keep accounts, 
or even to know their costs of production (the economy being 
in effect treated as one big enterprise without inter­
departmental invoices). This not only caused inefficiency 
(including hoarding of labour): project evaluation also
became practically impossible.
18. No attempt was made to match rises in wages, pensions, 
public services or investment (or reductions in prices) by 
measures to absorb the consequent increases of purchasing 
power, and the government has persistently rejected a 
currency reform (apart from a confiscation of large notes 
soon after the revolution). So cash in the hands of the
1) There have, however, been medium-term physical plans 
for^particular sectors, and annual plans for foreign 
exchange, labour use and key products.
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public rose to very high levels:^ retail inventories
virtually disappeared (except for reading matter and
pharmaceuticals); and long queues had become a familiar
sight. There appears also to have been a considerable 
2 )black market. '
19. The market imbalance had results somewhat inconsis­
tent with social objectives. A family’s consumption level 
came to depend partly on whether its members had between 
them the time and stamina needed for queuing, which 
penalised the elderly and those with children under school 
age, and partly on access to official transport, canteens, 
etc.
20. It also meant a vicious circle: queueing led to
absenteeism and production difficulties, which in turn 
aggravated the shortages. Moreover, since many families 
could not spend the wages of their employed males, the 
government made little progress in its attempt to mobilise 
the female labour reserve of 14- million. In addition the 
prevalence of absenteeism and black market operations 
impaired the appeal to moral incentives.
21. Cuban experience in the 1960s turns out, therefore, not 
to have been a proper test of an egalitarian policy - this 
does not necessarily entail the abondonment of financial 
controls, or complete abolition of material incentives. It 
is possible, however, that all these policies had their 
roots in the years of guerrilla warfare, when there was, of 
course, no need for accountancy or an appeal to material
1) At the end of 1970, this reached about 3.3 billion 
pesos, or more than the total annual wage bill. 
(Dorticos loc cit).
2) Prime Minister’s speech, 1 May, 1971. The highly 
specific nature of the rationing system encouraged 
ration-swapping, which is the starting point of a black market.
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incentives.^ ^
The recent change in strategy
22. In 1970 this complex of problems grew worse, partly
because of the diversion of labour to the attempted sugar
crop of 10 million tons. A sweeping change of policy took
place, designed to increase material incentives as well as
to restore financial balance, both overall and for pro- 
2}duction units. ' Prices of ’non-essential’ goods were 
raised sharply, those of restaurant meals being at least 
doubled and of rum trebled. New production norms were 
introduced. An "anti-loafing" law was passed. Television 
sets, refrigerators and even apartments started to be 
offered as prizes for good records of attendance and pro­
duction; and it was decided to make cars available to 
technicians and union officials. Wage increases were 
linked to productivity. Some pension rates were lowered 
(for those yet to retire). Accounting was reintroduced 
and a standard system adoped in 1973. Government state­
ments stressed the importance of saving materials and 
electricity.
23. A development plan for 1971 - 5 was also prepared. 
Although this focusses conventionally on a high growth 
rate (11$), ^  it could be argued that aggregates have 
more significance now that income .is distributed more equi­
tably, poverty has been reduced and production is concen­
trated on necessities.
1) Another contributory factor may have been the euphoria 
which followed the successful repulsion of the Bay of 
Pigs invasion.
2) A recent policy statement by Pidel Castro admitted 
implicitly that the distribution of income had not been 
closely enough geared to productive contribution. (Speech 
to the 13th Congress of the CTC Granma 25th Nov.73)
Before reaching communism, which implied distribution 
according to need, it was necessary to first apply "the 
inexorable law" of socialism, that each should be paid 
according to his labour.
3) Economia y Desarrollo. I0.I3 , 1972. p.194. The growth 
rate of agriculture, arart from sugar, is put at the very 
high rate of 16.4#.
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24. It is far too early to see the impact of the new
policies on equality, production or poverty. However,
cash in the public's hands has fallen; 1 absenteeism has
declined; and the national income is reported to have
risen by in 1972, despite a poor sugar crop, and 1 yfo
2)(very provisionally) in 1973. The quantity of
under-utilised capital and human resources in 1971 cer­
tainly permitted a surge forward in output, including 
foodstuffs. However the new policies may well cause 
some of what was previously disguised unemployment (because 
of the hoarding of labour) to emerge into the open. And 
the distribution of consumption is becoming rather less 
equal. So the growth in production may not mean a 
comparable rise in consumption at the lowest levels.
25. While interpretation of Cuban experience is compli­
cated by the temporary abolition of financial controls, 
this experience suggests that very drastic redistribution, 
especially if it takes the form of abolishing material 
incentives, may interfere with the reduction of poverty 
(at least in a society which has been conditioned to expect 
personal rewards). How that financial controls are being 
introduced, it will be easier to assess whether what is 
still a highly egalitarian society has the dynamic potential 
to complete the task of eliminating poverty.
1) Castro, loc. cit. The reduction had been 1230-m. pesos 
in 2y years.
2) Ibid.
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